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Michael Ulan, William G. Dewald and James B. Bullard ,Piorecasts are regularly used in making fiscal monetary policy decisions. For many a decisionmakers, the likely short-term effect of a proposed action is a major concern in deciding whether to implement a particular policy. Such decisions are typically made in the context of considerable uncertainty, not only about what the likely effects of a particular action might be, but also about the momentum and direction of aggregate economic variables in themselves. Thus, an important concern from a policy point of -view is the extent to which forecasts are reliable representations of economic outcomes at relatively short horizons, such as a year.
The purpose of this article is to report facts concerning the accuracy of the U.S.
official forecasts of real output growth and inflation from 1976 to 1990 for the Group of Seven (G-7) economies: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany Though widely distributed within the government, the Administration forecasts had been classified and not available to the public. We obtained the forecasts for years through 1990 under a Freedom of Information Act request with the helpful cooperation of the Treasury Department.
The accuracy of these forecasts is measured against the standard of actual real output growth and inflation as subsequently published in the Treasury's World Economic Outlook (WEb). The Administration forecasts and their accuracy are reported along with a number of alternative forecasts. The primary comparison is to projections made for the G-7 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and by Data Resources Incorporated (DRI). For the United States only we also compare the Administration forecasts to those made by the Blue Chip consensus and the U.S. Federal Reserve "Greenbook."
1 For each country and for the G-7 nations taken as a whole, the outlooks are evaluated on the basis of the differences between predictions and outcomes. The predictions and outcomes are expressed in terms of year-over-year percentage changes. The statistics cited are the sum of squared errors, the mean squared errors, the root mean squared errors (RMSE) and the bias (sum of prediction minus outcome). We think these measures provide simple but effective summary statistics useful in evaluating forecast accuracy THE ACJVHNISTPJTIUON t~~,r r~c~r r~CÃ
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The errors in the Administration forecasts of real gross national product (GNP) (gross domestic product, GDF in some cases) growth in the G-7 nations are shown in Figure 1 . The summary statistics relating to the errors in these forecasts appear in Table 1 . The sum of squared errors of the Administration's real output growth forecasts is largest for Canada, the United States and West Germany Just under half of the forecast errors were of a different sign from the errors of the preceding year The number of sign reversals of forecast error, not counting a zero error as a sign change, ranged from four for Japan to eight for the United States.
Like the other forecasters, the Administration simply missed the deep recessions in 1982 in the United States and Canada. The Administration forecasted 3.4 percent real 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 fl US.
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The Administration forecast errors for inflation from 1976 to 1990 in the G-7 nations are shown in Figure 2 , while Table 2 presents the associated summary statistics. The Administration forecasts of U.S. inflation in 1980 pertained to the GNP deflator rather than the consumerprice index (CPI). Hence, for this year the forecast error is calculated with respect to the change in that measure rather than the CPI. The sum of squared errors is largest for Italy and the United Kingdom. The large error in the forecast of United Kingdom inflation in 1978 is attributable primarily to a decline in inflation in that year; inflation fell from 15.8 percent in 1977 to 8.3 percent in 1978. It subsequently rebounded to 13.4 percent in 1979. During 1978, there were price controls in force on some components of the CPI market basket and, at government urging, unions moderated their wage demands. In 1979, with the election of a Conservative government, the unions returned to no-holds-barred wage bargaining, and the government not only removed price controls but also increased the rate of value-added tax applicable to several items in the CPI market basket, boosting inflation during that year.
As Table 2 reveals, the Administration tended to underpredict inflation in Italy and the United Kingdom, countries with high average inflation rates, and to overpredict inflation in West Germany and Japan, countries with comparatively low inflation. Errors in one direction were followed by errors in the other direction about a third of the time- Table 3 . The OECD makes several assumptions about members' economies in projecting each nation's economic growth. The organization assumes that the exchange rate of the nation's currency during a year remains at the level of Novemberin the previous year (the month the projections were prepared), that fiscal policy will remain unchanged and that the price of oil relative to thai'of OECD exports of manufactures will remain constant. The reasoning behind these assumptions is that the OECD is "advising" its member governments where they are headed economically if they continue to pursue current policies, not taking into account prospective changes in policies. Hence, the OECD considers its product a projection rather than a forecast. Table 3 shows that, for each G-7 nation except Italy the sum of squared errors of the OECD real growth projection is smaller than that for the Administration's forecast errors. For both the OECD and the Administration, the smallest sum of squared errors was achieved in the case of France, while the country evidently posing the most difficulty over this period was To what might one attribute the generally greater accuracy of the OECD projections compared with the Administration's forecasts? One factor might be that OECD projections of real output growth in the G-7 nations were made closer to the beginning of the forecast year. The OFCD might also be in a better position to closely follow the economic performance of many nations by evaluating worldwide influences than is the Administration, whose forecasts are largely dependent on inputs from individual countries. On the other hand, the OECD procedure simply assumes unchanged fiscal policies, exchange rates and real oil prices. These might be factors that would lead to less accuracy in their projections to the extent that such factors have a predictable effect on real output growth. Both the Administration forecasts and the OECD projections of real growth display bias, according to our measure-but in opposite directions. The Administration's real output growth forecasts in total are biased upward, with the main contributors to the total being the errors associated with the United States and Canada. In contrast, except for Canadian economic growth, the OECD projections are biased downwardsubstantially for the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom.
Since one large error can mar an otherwise good performance, we also examined the data with the largest error omitted; the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 .
With one observation deleted, the sum of squared errors of both the Administration and OECD forecasts tend to be much smaller and much the same.
Our data set contained complete DRI forecasts of economic growth and inflation for all the G-7 countries for the period of 1983 to 1990. The summary statistics pertaining to these DRI forecasts are compared with those of the Administration and the OECD over the same period in Tables 5 and 6 . Save for the real growth forecasts for Italy Japan and the United States, the DRI forecasts over this evaluation period were more accurate than either the Administration forecasts or the OECD projections. DRI was also more accurate than the Administration in forecasting inflation for every country except Japan during this period.
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rA/sfrnsftncscJc /A~A/~roN//nAñ~A /aa~A/-n.~st~.A/. months into a recession that would not bottom out for 14 months. The Greenbook and OECD forecasts, both of which, it is important to add, were made later in the year, were considerably better, predicting -0.6 and -0.5, respectively, versus an actual outcome of -1.9. As shown in Table 9 , in contrast to the situation withrespect to real output growth, the Administration was a marginally more accurate forecaster of U.S. inflation over the period 1980-90 than the Greenbook and also more accurate than the Blue Chip survey DRI was the most accurate overall for the United States, and DRI also predicted Canadian inflation more accurately than the Administration.
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Summary statistics with the largest forecast error omitted are presented in Table 10 . In this case, the Administration forecasts hold up very well against those of the other forecasters for the United States, as do DRI's inflation forecasts for Canada.
SUMMAR~V
Comparing Administration forecasts to Blue Chip consensus, DRI, Federal Reserve Greenbook and OECD predictions of real output growth in the U.S. economy we find that the Administration tended to see the future more optimistically and less accurately than the other forecasters. forecast the output decline in 1982. Deleting that observation substantially enhances measured forecast accuracy reducing the RMSE from 1.78 to 1.18 over the 1976 to 1990 period. U.S. official forecasts were better with respect to inflation, as the Administration was one of the best among those compared in forecasting U.S. CPI inflation between 1980 and 1990. The Administration's forecasts of economic growth for almost all G-7 countries were less accurate than the OECD projections for the period 1976 to 1990. The biases in the Administration's forecasts tend to be positive; those in the forecasts of U.S. and Canadian real output growth are particularly large. The biases in the OECD projections tend to be negative; those associated with projections of Italian and U.K. real output growth are large. For the G-7 as a whole, the projections of the OECD are much more accurate than those of the Administration. Over the 1983 to 1990 period, DRI was more accurate than either the Administration or the OECD for four of the G-7 countries.
The differences between the forecast errors of the Administration and the forecast (or projection) errors of the other forecasters may arise from differences in the times at which the forecasts or projections were prepared, a situation that may have influenced the quality of the historical baseline available to forecasters and the values of exogenous GNP and GDP data are frequently revised. It was necessary to choose a fixed target to which to compare the forecasts. We used the Treasury Department's historical data, which it provided along with its forecasts in each issue of the WEO. Generally, historical data on GNP or GNP changes for a particular year continue to appear in the WEO for about 18 months following the end of that year. The last historical citation of the annual change in national GNP or GDP appearing in the WEO is the outcome to which the forecasts are compared.
2 Although CPI data tend not to be revised after they are issued, a similar procedure has been followed in selecting the inflation data with which to compare the forecasts. 
